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This paper deals with the behavior of fair trade organizations in an
oligopolistic setting in which the vertically integrated fair trade ﬁrm
produces a commodity which is a weak substitute for another commodity.
Proﬁt-maximizing oligopolists are vertically disintegrated and produce for
both markets and the fair trade ﬁrm can charge a premium to consumers
due to a “warm glow eﬀect” that depends on the wage paid to fair trade
producers. We show that trade integration will unambiguously increase the
size of the fair trade ﬁrm. However, the relative size compared to oligopolists
shrinks with integration. The eﬀect of a change in substitutability between
the two commodities on markets shares depends on the relative market
potential. Furthermore, we show that the warm glow eﬀect does not support
an expansion of the volume of fair trade.
JEL-Classiﬁcation: F12.
Keywords: Fair trade, integration, imperfect competition.1 Introduction
In recent years many countries have seen a sharp increase in the prevalence
of so-called Fair Trade (FT) products. Worldwide sales of FT coﬀee, cocoa,
tea, rice, sugar, honey, fruit, textiles and other handicrafts grew at over 3%
annually in the 1990s and demand for FT coﬀee in particular has grown
much more rapidly than demand for coﬀee overall.1 The FT movement has
been most successful in Europe, where Fairtrade Labeling Organizations In-
ternational (FLO) claim that Fair Trade products are sold in over 55,000
supermarkets. In Switzerland, for example, Fair Trade products account for
over 45% of the banana market, over 25% of the ﬂower market and nearly
10% of all sugar sold.2
Commencing in the Netherlands in 1973 (although the Fair Trade label
had its origins in 1988), these FT organisations essentially oﬀer a certiﬁca-
tion to producers that meet certain standards. Howley (2006) describes the
operation of TransFair USA, the US operation of the 1989 Dutch company,
as certifying Fair Trade products and auditing the production chain from
grower to ﬁnal retailer. The certiﬁcation of farms is undertaken by FLO,
a collective organization which speciﬁes criteria that farms must satisfy to
receive the stamp of approval. The carrot oﬀered to members is that the
FLO guarantees a minimum ﬂoor price for certiﬁed members that not only
provides stability in an extremely volatile market but ensures a premium
on the market price.3 It is important to note that obtaining FT certiﬁca-
1The growth rate of FT sales comes from Ronchi (2006, p1), who also notes that FT
coﬀee accounted for only about 0.5% of the 2004 market in the US, the world’s largest
market, but around 6% in Switzerland in 2005 and 20% in the U.K. Further, she reports
that the average growth rate of sales of FT coﬀee since its introduction in North America
in 1998 has been 65% and 47% for the Canadian and US markets respectively. Wilkinson
(2006) suggests that the FT coﬀee share of the specialty coﬀee market grew from 0.6% to
4.3% from 2000 to 2006 (and 0.2% to 2.2% of total coﬀee sales, the specialty market going
from a third of the overall market to over half of the US$22b total US coﬀee market in
2006.)
2These ﬁgures on supermarket numbers come from Krier (2005 p.9) and those on
Switzerland are from Krier (2005 p.65).
3For Arabica coﬀee, for example, it pays $1.26 if the New York price is less than $1.21,
otherwise it pays the New York price plus ﬁve cents. Since 2000 there have only been two
brief periods during which the latter price was the relevant one. In the Robusta coﬀee
1tion requires more of a farm than simply being willing to receive a higher
price; signiﬁcantly, a farm must be strictly a family concern (employing no
long-term hired labor) and must be a member of a large cooperative:4 the
FLO does not deal with individual farms but with collectives of small farms.
Once producers comply with the eligibility criteria, they receive approval to
contact licensed importers. These importers are expected to supply credit to
growers but pay no fee. Roasters and distributors pay a license fee for the
right to use the fair trade logo.
This collective structure is an important feature of FT production and
is central to our analysis. Milford (2004) ﬁnds “clear evidence” that co-ops
use “membership regulations actively in order to obtain a speciﬁc level of
membership and a corresponding volume of coﬀee” (p.52). That is, while, in
principle, these FT cooperatives are meant to be open to all new members
willing to produce by the FT guidelines, de facto they do constrain output.
She also examines the eﬃciency of co-op operations and ﬁnds evidence of
“free-rider” problems in the management and control of co-ops. This is a key
feature of the model of this paper.
The driving force behind the FT movement in the coﬀee market has
been a process of dramatic change in the return to growers: the real price
of coﬀee beans has fallen precipitously – to approximately 25% of its 1960
level in 20015 – as world production has increased,6 with the consequence that
returns to growers have declined precipitously. Many developing countries are
highly dependent on coﬀee exports in their export portfolios (according to
the World Bank, in 2000 coﬀee exports provided 79% of total export revenue
in Burundi, 54% in Ethiopia and 43% in Uganda (Gresser and Tickell, 2002
market the relevant market price has not reached the Fairtrade ﬂoor price in over ten
years.
4Other requirements imposed on cooperatives include restrictions on their political
structure and independence and requirements regarding openness to new members: see
Rice (2001) and Milford (2004). We discuss the international coﬀee market more fully in
Appendix A.1 of this paper.
5Figure 4 of Gresser and Tickell (2002) looks at US December basis spot prices per
pound in US cents and shows a decline from 126.8 in 1980 to 46.2 in 2001.
6Figure 5 of Gresser and Tickell (2002) indicates that world production of coﬀee beans
has risen from around 80m bags (a bag being 60kgs) in 1979/80 to 115m bags in 2001/2.
2p.8)); consequently, a number of very poor countries – particularly in Africa
and Central America – have encountered serious ﬁnancial diﬃculties as a
result of these market changes.
Fair trade has not been universally applauded, however (see The
Economist 2006 and Lindsey, 2003.) One criticism is that, by increasing
and guaranteeing the price received by farmers, it insulates farmers from
the market signals provided by falling prices, reducing incentives for diversi-
ﬁcation and inducing excessive supply that keeps market prices low. Another
criticism is that it reduces incentives for quality improvement by individual
farmers, due to the collective structure of growers’ cooperatives. Finally, as a
means of delivering assistance to poor farmers, the eﬃciency of FT has been
questioned: Harford (2006) suggests that the price premium paid to farmers
should translate into less than a penny a cup of coﬀee to consumers and yet
the premium charged is more typically ten times this amount.7
This retail premium for FT products suggests that they are perceived as
imperfect substitutes for non-FT goods and yet the product diﬀerentiation is,
eﬀectively, in the production process and not in the ﬁnal consumer product.
This is a feature of a number of other ‘ethical’ goods such as dolphin-friendly
tuna, goods produced without child labor, even organic food and so-called
low air-miles food, and this dimension of our model can apply to the analysis
of markets for these goods, too.
The overall success of the FT movement raises a number of interesting
questions. If it pays FT ﬁrms to adopt this production technology, then
why do not all ﬁrms do it? What has led to the increase in prominence of
FT ﬁrms? At the same time that FT has become such a phenomenon, we
have also observed a bifurcation in coﬀee consumption along quality lines,
with FT ﬁrms operating exclusively in the ’gourmet’ sector of the roast and
ground market, the high quality segment of the coﬀee market (the low quality
segment being the market for instant coﬀee). How does this aﬀect the viability
of FT ﬁrms? Given that FT ﬁrms are eﬀectively vertically integrated, from
the farm to the consumer, how can they survive against non-integrated lower-
7Harford (2006, p.33) argues that the price diﬀerence charged by retailers may simply
be an instrument of price discrimination.
3cost multinational competitors? Does the collective structure of FT ﬁrms
aﬀect incentives of growers? What is the importance of the so-called ‘ethical
consumer’ – the consumer willing to pay a premium for FT products?
In this paper we develop a model of a market in which a vertically in-
tegrated FT ﬁrm competes against a number of oligopolistic competitors,
in order to address these – and other – questions. There are two quality-
diﬀerentiated markets, the products in which are imperfect substitutes in
demand and the FT ﬁrm competes in one only (the high quality market)
with or without oligopolistic rivals (depending on parameter values.) The FT
ﬁrm contracts with an endogenously chosen number of farmers but the cost
of transforming their inputs into high-quality output depends (negatively) on
the quality of the inputs and this, in turn, depends on unobservable farmer
eﬀort. This yields a moral hazard problem facing the FT ﬁrm that is not
faced by its rivals who deal with growers on a spot market where inputs are
provided at minimum quality but require added processing to be transformed
into high quality outputs. The moral hazard problem endogenously limits the
optimal size of the FT collective. The FT ﬁrm also returns all surplus from its
operations to its growers in the form of a wage premium over the wages paid
by rivals and, in turn, induces a higher willingness-to-pay from consumers
who derive a ”warm glow” eﬀect from the knowledge that they are delivering
more to growers. Finally, all ﬁrms incur trade costs in shipping the growers’
outputs to their processing plants in the ﬁnal country of consumption.
In this setting we ﬁrst derive the equilibrium outputs, prices and surplus
to FT growers. We then consider a number of comparative statics exercises to
determine, inter alia, the consequences of trade cost reductions, the impacts
of changes in market size and the eﬀects of a decrease in the degree of per-
ceived substitutability between qualities of the ﬁnal good. We also address
some welfare issues. It should be noted up front that our model does not pur-
port to analyse all of the criticisms of the FT movement; in particular, we do
not model the volatility of prices and the insurance component of FT prac-
tices (or, indeed, the notion that these practices encourage overproduction
through the insulation of FT farmers from market signals).
What existing literature there is on this topic is largely non-analytical. A
4number of authors (Maseland and de Vaal, 2002, Milford, 2004, Hayes, 2006)
have observed that a FT organization can oﬀset monopsonistic behaviour
in an input market. Leclair (2002) documents the increasing signiﬁcance of
FT generally while Milford (2004) provides a discussion more focused on
coﬀee in particular. She also provides some graphical analysis and discussion
of input markets with a monopsonist in competition with a non-proﬁt co-
operative, the latter either being open to all prospective members or closed.
The analysis is all partial equilibrium, however, and considers only the input
market.
Only Becchetti and Adriani (2002) have a comprehensive analytical model
of FT that considers the role of consumers willing to pay a premium for FT
products. In their model, Northern consumers can obtain higher utility from
a good if they consider it to be “fairly” produced in the South and it is
produced in the South by a monopsonist that can choose to pay workers
their marginal product (MP - a “fair” wage) or less (“unfair”) and by a
FT ﬁrm that always pays MP. They argue that, if consumers have “inter-
national equality concerned” preferences and there is “eﬃcient rationing”
(in the sense that the FT ﬁrm can allocate its jobs to those workers with
the lowest reservation wages), then equilibrium involves both types of ﬁrms
paying MP to their workers whereas, with no FT ﬁrm (but unchanged pref-
erences) the monopsonist would pay less than MP. This occurs because the
FT ﬁrm hires those workers with the lowest outside options, thereby forcing
the monopsonist to pay more than it otherwise would. However, in contrast
to the present paper, Becchetti and Adriani do not model the cooperative
nature of FT production and nor is there any responsiveness of consumer
welfare to the level of Southern wages: the good is simply considered to be
fairly produced or not.
Becchetti and Adriani’s analysis is similar to that of papers that consider
the impact of eco-labeling on trade (see e.g. Graeker, 2006, and M¨ alk¨ onen,
2005 and, for models incorporating green consumers, Conrad, 2005, and
Eriksson, 2004). Eco-labeling is modelled such that consumers care about
the environmental impact of a good, if they are able to learn it, but they do
not care about the factor rewards of producers. Fair trade is predominantly
5concerned about factor rewards but less concerned about the production pro-
cess.8 An environmentally friendly production method may become a neces-
sary condition for successful FT production, but it is not suﬃcient unless FT
producers receive a “fair” wage.9
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section
we present our model and Section 3 discusses the equilibrium while Section 4
undertakes a number of comparative statics and policy exercises of interest.
Section 5 concludes. For expositional convenience, we have relegated the main
bulk of our proofs to the appendices, along with a discussion of the structure
of the world coﬀee market, which motivates some of our modeling choices.
2 The Model
There are two countries, home and foreign, with all initial production in
the foreign country but all consumption at home. There are also two qual-
ities of the good for sale and they are perceived by consumers as imperfect
substitutes. We distinguish two types of ﬁrms: a fair trade ﬁrm (henceforth
labeled as FT) and other ﬁrms which we will label oligopolists. The FT ﬁrm
serves the high quality market only and its supply is equal to z, whereas all
oligopolists produce X(Y ) for the low (high) quality market. Demand be-
havior can be determined by considering the optimal consumption plan of a
representative consumer. The utility function of the representative consumer
is quasi-linear and given by
8At least in principle. De facto, as noted above, FT certifying organizations do impose
a signiﬁcant number of restrictions on their members in terms of the organization of
production. See footnote 4 and the references therein.
9Note that this notion of a fair wage is diﬀerent from the one used in the fair wage
literature on trade (see for example Kreickemeyer and Nelson, 2006). In this literature, a
fair wage is similar to an eﬃciency wage such that the eﬀorts of a worker are positively
related to the perceived fairness of the wage.
6˜ U = U(X,Y,z) + Q, (1)




2 + 2γX(Y + z) + (Y + z)
2)
+δwz,
γ ∈ [0,1],A,α,δ > 0,
where X denotes consumption of the low quality commodity, Y (z) denotes
consumption of the high quality commodity which is produced by oligopolists
(by the FT ﬁrm), and Q is the consumption of a commodity which is produced
under perfect competition. Q is the numeraire in our model. The term δwz
is the ”warm glow” eﬀect which is explained below in detail.
We assume that one unit of labor is required to produce one unit of
commodity Q, and that the total labor endowment is ﬁxed at L. Accordingly,
the representative consumer maximizes expression (1) subject to the budget
constraint
pX + qY + rz + Q = L, (2)
where p,q and r denote the respective prices for X,Y and z. Maximization
leads to the inverse demand functions
p = A − X − γ(Y + z), (3)
q = α − (Y + z) − γX,
r = α − (Y + z) − γX + δw.
Utility maximization of the representative agent gives rise to the existence
of two markets, a low quality market and a high quality market, because the
price for the high quality commodity received by the FT ﬁrm diﬀers from the
price received by the oligopolists only by a wage premium. Hence, we will
use
p = A − X − γ(Y + z),q = α − (Y + z) − γX (4)
7only and add a wage premium for the FT ﬁrm. High and low quality com-
modities are (weak) substitutes and the parameter γ measures the degree of
substitutability.
We assume that the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed such that there is only one
FT ﬁrm but n oligopolists. As for the oligopolists, we adopt the standard
assumption that they are proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms. They are able to serve both
the high and the low quality market. On the production side, oligopolists are
vertically disintegrated and acquire inputs on the international spot market.
Without loss of generality, we assume that each oligopolist requires one unit
of input to produce one unit of output. The marginal cost for producing
the low quality ﬁnal commodity is normalized to zero, but the high quality
commodity warrants a marginal cost of size c with c > 0.10
The market for intermediate inputs is competitive from the supply side
as there is a large number of producers. These producers are located in the
foreign country, and each producer can produce one unit of the intermediate
input. If the producer is not oﬀered a contract with the FT ﬁrm, it has to
decide whether to produce one unit of the intermediate input, which will
be sold on the international market, or to pick an outside option whose
payoﬀ we have normalized to zero. Accordingly, the price of the intermediate
input on the international market will be zero irrespective of the demand by
oligopolists.11
This practice and, in particular, the market power of oligopolists, is not
felt to be fair, even by consumers of the ﬁnal commodity, and this discomfort
gives rise to the establishment of a diﬀerent type of ﬁrm – the FT ﬁrm –
which has a diﬀerent objective. It produces high quality commodities only12
and guarantees credibly that all proceeds net of production costs are given
10While we have normalized the oligopolists’ costs of producing the low quality good
to zero, our focus is on the cost premium of producing high quality goods (those that
compete with the FT ﬁrm) and this is captured in c.
11If producers had market power, double marginalization would occur and would make
vertical integration proﬁtable.
12As discussed by Sutton (1991), production of instant coﬀee involves substantial ﬁxed
costs in comparison to production of roast coﬀee beans, either whole or ground, so, in
the coﬀee market at least, this explains the fact that FT ﬁrms operate only in the latter,
high-quality, sub-sector.
8back to individual producers. The FT ﬁrm is vertically integrated with pro-
ducers as it produces the ﬁnal output exclusively with the input of producers
with which it has signed an exclusive contract. Hence, the FT ﬁrm does
not use the international market, and producers signing a contract with the
FT ﬁrm (henceforth labeled as FT producers) will exclusively produce the
intermediate input for the FT ﬁrm.
As the oligopolists use the spot market for buying the intermediate input
whereas the FT ﬁrm uses contracts with producers, it is natural that the
FT ﬁrm can commit to its output before oligopolists decide on their input
decisions. Furthermore, as proﬁt maximizing oligopolists are vertically dis-
integrated, vertical integration comes with an additional cost. The contract
between the FT ﬁrm and the FT producer is assumed to be incomplete as it
speciﬁes the delivery of one unit of the intermediate input, but not the eﬀort
of each producer to reduce the overall production cost of the ﬁnal (high qual-
ity) commodity. This eﬀort is not observable and thus FT production suﬀers
from a moral hazard problem due to vertical integration. Table 1 gives the
sequence of decisions of the game, which we will solve in the usual backward
induction fashion.
Table 1: Game structure
Stage I:
FT ﬁrm decides on the number of FT producers.
Stage II:
Each FT producer decides on eﬀorts to reduce production costs.
Stage III:
Oligopolists decide simultaneously
on their production levels in both markets.
The other notable diﬀerence between FT production and production by
oligopolists is the warm glow eﬀect of FT production. Since the FT ﬁrm
can credibly guarantee that it gives all proﬁts back to the producers, it is
able to earn a wage premium on top of the high quality price q. This wage
premium is the “make me feel good” eﬀect consumers experience when they
9contribute to the success of a business which is felt to be based on fair trade
rules. We assume that consumers are willing to pay δw more per unit of the
high quality commodity if it is oﬀered by the FT ﬁrm, where w denotes the
wage premium paid to each FT producer (and thus, given that the wage of
oligopolists is normalized to zero, the wage itself) and δ ∈ [0,1].13
In order to determine each producer’s payoﬀ, let c0 denote the production
cost of the FT ﬁrm, and let t denote the per unit trade cost of the intermediate
input.14 Since each producer produces one unit, its wage is determined by
the price in the high quality market, complemented by the wage premium
and corrected for costs:
α − z − Y − γX + δw − c0 − t = w ⇔ w =
α − z − Y − γX − c0 − t
1 − δ
.
As for the production cost, we assume that each FT producer can make a
contribution by individual eﬀorts ej such that





with θ,λ > 0. We are now ready to determine the behavior of each FT
producer. It correctly anticipates the number of all fellow FT producers and
maximizes its payoﬀ





where the quadratic term gives the individual cost of the unobservable eﬀorts.
Maximizing over individual eﬀort leads to
13We assume that the consumer perceives the two high-quality goods to be perfect
substitutes in all respects other than the preference for ’fair’ production techniques. An
alternative way of modeling the eﬀect of FT labelling would be to suppose that an FT
product is perceived as an imperfect substitute for its oligopoly rival products. We are
grateful to Peter Neary for this observation.
14Note that our analysis does not warrant that the FT ﬁrm’s marginal cost is higher
that the marginal cost c. However, c0 > c might be the result of vertical disintegration
being the most eﬃcient production method, but a FT trade ﬁrm can claim to be fair only















µ(1 − δ)2 ≡ v
∗. (5)
The asterisks denote optimal levels, and v∗ uses symmetry among FT pro-
ducers. Expression (5) shows that the FT producer’s surplus consists of two
parts, the price-cost margin and the reduction in production cost due to
producers’ eﬀort. The price-cost margin declines with the number of FT pro-
ducers and the aggregate output of oligopolists, while the production cost
reduction also gets smaller with z, as the moral hazard problem becomes
more severe with an increase in FT producers.
The FT ﬁrm correctly anticipates the behavior of each FT producer and
chooses their number to maximize the sum of payoﬀs of all FT producers,













Expression (6) takes into account that the FT ﬁrm is well aware that it pre-
commits to its high quality output z before the oligopolists become active.
This is the reason why both X and Y depend on z. Given that each FT
producer is relatively small, we will ignore the integer constraint in the re-
mainder of the paper. However, it takes at least one FT producer to establish
a vertically integrated FT ﬁrm so that z ≥ 1.
3 Fair Trade Equilibrium
In this section, we discuss the behavior of the FT ﬁrm and the oligopolists.
The oligopolists move last in this game and they know, or they correctly
anticipate, how many FT producers have been hired by the FT ﬁrm. In
order to make the problem interesting, we assume that the oligopolists will
be active at least in one market. Let z∗ denote the optimal number of FT
producers. We require:




11Assumption 1 guarantees that the oligopolists are at least active in the low
quality market. We now solve the game by backward induction. In stage 3,
each oligopolist maximizes its proﬁts Πi ≡ (p − t)xi + (q − c − t)yi which
leads to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
p − t + pXxi + qXyi = 0, (7)
q − c − t + qYyi + pYxi ≤ 0,yi ≥ 0,
yi(q − c − t + qYyi + pYxi) = 0,
where the subscripts denote the partial derivatives of the inverse demand
function w.r.t. respective aggregate output levels.15 Note that oligopolists
have to take a cannibalization eﬀect into account: an increase in output in
one market will decrease the price in the other market, and this eﬀect is
stronger with a larger γ. Based on condition (7), we now have to distinguish
two cases. If yi = 0, oligopolists do not serve the high quality market, and








i = 0. (8)
If yi > 0, oligopolists serve both markets and their output levels (denoted by




A − (1 − γ)t − γ(α − c)





α − γA − (1 − γ)t − c − (1 − γ2)z
(n + 1)(1 − γ2)
.
Note that z aﬀects y∗∗
i only but not x∗∗
i . In particular, an increase or decrease
in z will not change x∗∗
i . The reason is that an increase in z has two eﬀects on
ﬁrm behavior in the low quality market, a direct and an indirect eﬀect. First,
the low quality market becomes less attractive as more imperfect substitutes
are on the market (despite the decline in y∗∗
i ), and this direct eﬀect would
make x∗∗
i decrease. However, y∗∗
i and x∗∗
i are strategic substitutes, and since
y∗∗
i decreases, the cannibalization eﬀect has been reduced and x∗∗
i should
15It can easily be shown that the second order conditions Πxx,Πyy < 0,ΠxxΠyy > Π2
xy
are fulﬁlled.
12increase. In our model with an identical γ across quality types and linear
demand, both eﬀects cancel each other.
From (9), we can infer the critical level of z which makes the FT ﬁrm
monopolize the high quality market. Monopolization will (not) occur if z is
larger (smaller) than
  z ≡
α − c − (1 − γ)t − γA
1 − γ2 . (10)
The FT ﬁrm will maximize its surplus (6), correctly anticipating the





















More precisely, we have to distingush between the two cases of rivalry or no



























if z >   z
(12)
From expression (12), we ﬁnd that the surplus function is continuous and










At z = ˆ z, the surplus function has a kink. If – coincidentally – the optimal
number of FT producers were equal to ˆ z, the FT ﬁrm’s reaction to changes
in parameters and oligopolistic output would be subject to inertia until the
marginal surplus is changed more than marginally. We will not consider this
case, but it is noteworthy that an FT ﬁrm may not respond to changes, and
this is due to the kink in the surplus function. Except for ˆ z, the optimal
behavior of an active FT ﬁrm can be determined by dS/dz = 0 because the
next lemma demonstrates that the suﬃcient condition is fulﬁlled.
Lemma 1 S(z) is a strictly concave function.
13Proof: see Appendices A.2 and A.3.
The ﬁrst-order condition dS/dz = 0 gives the behavior of the FT ﬁrm only
if this ﬁrm is viable. Lemma 2 shows that at least one FT producer who is
better oﬀ compared to producing for the spot market is required to establish
an FT ﬁrm.
Lemma 2 A fair trade ﬁrm will not be established if v∗(1) < 0.
Proof: According to (12), dS/dz < v∗, and if v∗(1) < 0 surplus will be
negative for all z > 1. ￿
From Lemma 2, we may derive conditions under which an FT ﬁrm will (not)
be established:
Corollary 1 A fair trade ﬁrm will not be established if trade costs are too
high and/or the warm glow eﬀect is too small.
Proof: This follows from eq. (6) for S(1) < 0. In case of no competition in
the high quality market, S(1) < 0 for output levels according to (8) implies
α − 1 −
γn(A − γ)
n + 1
− θ − t






If oligopolists serve the high quality market, S(1) < 0 for output levels













We may already conclude from Corollary 1 that some combination of eco-
nomic integration and the warm glow eﬀect is an essential prerequisite for
the existence of an FT ﬁrm. Of course, even with δ = 0 we can still sustain an
FT ﬁrm, but this requires a suﬃciently low t. In the remainder of the paper,
we will assume that parameters are such that the FT ﬁrm will be viable.16
16We have assumed that the FT ﬁrm incurs only variable costs of operation but one
might also model the establishment of an integrated FT network as a ﬁxed cost. Doing
so will obviously lower the threshold level of trade costs above which and/or increase the
threshold level of δ below which a FT ﬁrm cannot operate, but it would not obviously add
anything further to the analysis of this paper.
144 Integration, Substitutability and Fair
Trade
In this section, we consider how changes in parameter values will aﬀect the
fair trade equilibrium. We consider only small parameter changes that do
not lead to a regime switch such that the FT ﬁrm switches from rivalry in
the high-quality market to non-rivalry or vice versa. We are in particular
interested in how economic integration, measured by a decline in trade cost
t, will aﬀect the fair trade equilibrium. Our next result extends Corollary 1
such that integration is crucial for the success of an FT ﬁrm.
Proposition 1 A decrease in trade cost increases the number of FT produc-
ers.
Proof: see Appendices A.2 and A.3.
Proposition 1 shows that the FT ﬁrm becomes larger with integration.
This holds true in both cases. While this result supports our ﬁnding that
integration is crucial for the establishment of an FT ﬁrm, we would also like
to enquire how the market share of an FT ﬁrm changes with integration.
Obviously, the market share will be unity if the FT ﬁrm monopolizes the
high-quality market. Proposition 2 demonstrates that the absolute increase
in size with integration does not imply an increase in relative size.
Proposition 2 Given that both the FT ﬁrm and the oligopolists are active
in the high quality market, a decrease in trade cost increases the market share
of oligopolists and decreases the market share of the FT ﬁrm.
Proof: The details of the computations can be found in Appendix A.3. The
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If dt < 0,dz∗ < −dt/2,dy∗∗
i > −dt/2. Hence, each oligopolist becomes rela-
tively larger, whereas the FT ﬁrm becomes relatively smaller. ￿
The intuition for this result is that a FT ﬁrm suﬀers from the moral hazard
problem. An expansion of FT producers necessarily implies that the marginal
cost of production goes up, whereas oligopolists continue to produce with
the same marginal cost. Note carefully that this will not drive the FT ﬁrm
out of the market but integration will beneﬁt oligopolists overproportionally
and the FT ﬁrm underproportionally. All ﬁrms, including the FT ﬁrm, will
produce more which will result in a rise in oligopolistic proﬁts and the FT
ﬁrm’s surplus (distributed back to producers).
It is unlikely that it is integration alone which has contributed to the
establishment of FT ﬁrms in recent years and the boom in the ‘boutique’
coﬀee market, so we also consider the impact of a perceived lessening of the
degree of substitutability, by consumers, between the two qualities of good
being produced. That is, we conduct comparative statics on γ. For the case
of no rivalry in the high quality market, the eﬀect of a change in γ on FT
production is ambiguous.
Proposition 3 If only the FT ﬁrm is active in the high quality market, FT






Proof: See Appendix A.2.
Note that Proposition 3 is neither in conﬂict with Assumption 1 nor with
condition (10). It shows that the response of the FT ﬁrm depends on the
16level of aggregate FT output. An increase in γ makes oligopolists and the
FT ﬁrm closer rivals. If the moral hazard problem of FT production is not
severe, the FT ﬁrm’s marginal costs increase only moderately, and thus the
FT ﬁrm will be large in size. An increase in γ will make the FT ﬁrm increase
output (and vice versa) because it is now more capable of stealing business
from the low quality market. A low size of the FT ﬁrm, however, indicates
a substantial moral hazard problem and strongly increasing marginal costs,
and the FT ﬁrm would like to reduce FT output in order to compensate
for the price decline in the high quality market. This decline is caused by
relatively eﬃcient oligopolists stealing business in the FT market. Hence, if
γ declines, we expect an increase (decrease) in the size of the FT ﬁrm if its
size has been small (large).
In the case of rivalry in the high-quality market, we ﬁnd, perhaps sur-
prisingly, that the substitutability parameter γ does not appear in the FT
ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order condition (see (A.6) in Appendix A.3). Hence, any change
in γ will not aﬀect the optimal number of FT producers. This result war-
rants an explanation. In our linear setting, we ﬁnd that the impact of the
aggregate output of the rival oligopolists due to a change in γ will just
neutralize each other. In fact, deﬁne Ω ≡ n(γX + Y ), and we ﬁnd that
dΩ/dγ = n(X+γdX/dγ+dY/dγ) = 0 (see (A.9) in Appendix A.3). Thus, any
change in market shares is driven by changes in output levels of oligopolists.
Proposition 4 shows that the eﬀect depends on the relative market potential
of the high-quality market, deﬁned as
α − c − t
A − t
.
Proposition 4 Given that both the FT ﬁrm and the oligopolists are active
in the high quality market, an increase in γ
1. will not change the number of FT producers,
2. will decrease (increase) the oligopolistic output in the low- (high-)quality
market if






173. will increase the oligopolistic output in both markets if










4. will increase (decrease) the oligopolistic output in the low- (high-)quality
market if






Proof: See Appendix A.3.
Proposition 4 demonstrates that a decrease in substitutability has a non-
monotonic impact on market shares. If the relative potential of the high
quality market is large, a decrease in γ will make the oligopolistic output in
the high quality market larger. Since the number of fair trade producers stays
constant, the market share of the FT ﬁrm will decline and the market share
of oligopolists will rise. On the other hand, if the relative market potential of
the high-quality market is small, y∗∗
i will decline, so that the FT ﬁrm’s market
share will rise and the oligopolistic market share will decline. Hence, we may
expect a decline in the FT ﬁrm’s market share if the relative potential of the
high-quality market is large or has become larger over time, when these two
commodities have become less substitutable at the same time.
Next, we consider the eﬀects of changes in consumers’ willingness to pay
a premium for FT products: an increase in the “warm glow” eﬀect. Not
surprisingly, this will lead to an expansion of the FT ﬁrm and the number of
FT producers and a decline in the operations of the oligopolistic ﬁrms.
Proposition 5 Given that both the FT ﬁrm and the oligopolists are active
in the high quality market, an increase in δ
1. will increase the number of FT producers and
2. will decrease the oligopolistic output in the high quality market.
Proof: See Appendix A.4.
Finally, given that integration increases FT production and enhances con-
sumers’ warm glow, we consider whether a small increase in FT at the margin
18– perhaps through a quota on non-FT trade or a small subsidy to FT pro-
duction – could raise welfare.17 This analysis draws upon trade policy papers
which determine under which conditions imports of a foreign ﬁrm should
be supported (or discouraged).18 The increase in consumer surplus must be
balanced against the decline in aggregate proﬁts, and the outcome is unclear
in general. Without any warm glow eﬀect, the eﬀect of an increase in z is
similar because an FT ﬁrm gives all net revenues back to producers.19 Let
us label the incentive or disincentive to increase z marginally without any
warm glow eﬀect the marginal import eﬀect. We would now like to explore
how this incentive is changed when fair trade is considered, and thus we call
the second eﬀect the marginal warm glow eﬀect.
We do this exercise for the case of competition in the high quality market
by considering a marginal expansion of FT production which has been set
equal to the optimal number of FT producers by the FT ﬁrm. Hence, the
marginal FT surplus will be equal to zero and any marginal change will have
only second-order eﬀects on the FT ﬁrm’s surplus. Using (7), we may write
the maximixed proﬁts of an oligopolist as Π∗∗
i = x2
i + y2
i + 2γxiyi, and since














where Π∗∗ denotes the aggregate proﬁts on the industry level. As expected,
aggregate proﬁts will decrease with FT production (i.e., dz > 0). As for























where dw∗/dz gives the marginal change of the equilibrium wage with FT
output. Deﬁning social welfare as W ≡ Π∗∗ + U + S(z), and since dY/dz =
17We do not model the dynamic consequences of FT ﬁrms, particularly the danger of
encouraging producers to overly postpone exit from a declining industry. Accordingly, our
welfare analysis, while looking at global welfare, is static in nature only.
18For an overview, see Feenstra (2004), Chapter 7.
19A further complication of our model is that the FT ﬁrm is a Stackelberg leader and
an increase in z aﬀects both markets.




γX − (Y − x)









      
(II)
. (14)
Term (I) is the marginal import eﬀect, the sign of which is ambiguous without
further assumptions, and term (II) is the marginal warm glow eﬀect, which
we are able to sign in order to prove Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 The marginal warm glow eﬀect is negative.







2µz2(1 − δ)2 < 0. ￿ (15)
Proposition 6 demonstrates that ceteris paribus the warm glow eﬀect does
not warrant an increase in FT production. Hence, if the marginal import
eﬀect is negative, the overall eﬀect is negative irrespective of the size of δ.
Furthermore, a positive but moderate marginal import eﬀect may be over-
compensated by the negative warm glow eﬀect.
Why does the warm glow eﬀect make promotion of FT products less
attractive? The reason is the increasing marginal cost which the FT ﬁrm
faces due the moral hazard problem. We may rewrite the marginal warm
















Eq. (15) demonstrates that this elasticity is less than −1. Hence, a relative
output increase implies an overproportionally large relative decrease in the
wage rate. A marginal increase in FT output leads to less eﬀorts by each FT
producer and thus an increase in marginal cost.20 In conclusion, the moral
hazard eﬀect of FT production works against any favorable treatment of FT
products.
20In fact, the marginal warm glow eﬀect would disappear if the marginal cost of
FT production were constant, contrary to our assumptions. In this case, λ = 0 and
(dw∗/w∗)/(dz/z) = −1 according to eq. (15).
205 Concluding Remarks
This paper has developed a model of the behavior of fair trade organizations,
taking into account the apparent fact that consumers are willing to pay more
for a fair trade product since consumption of fair trade products gives rise to
a warm glow eﬀect. However, fair trade production comes with an additional
cost, as any fair trade organization must be vertically integrated. This vertical
integration limits the size of the fair trade organization compared to its rivals
in international markets. In particular, while economic integration will make
the fair trade organization absolutely larger in size, its size shrinks relative
to that of its rivals. Hence, while we conclude that economic integration will
support the establishment and the increase in size of fair trade organizations,
our analysis suggests that there is a limit to the size that a fair trade ﬁrm
can attain - at least, under the ownership structures that current fair trade
ﬁrms impose – which constrains its ability to expand in competition with
non-vertically integrated rivals.
Furthermore, our analysis lends only partial support to the contention
that,“[t]he ethical consumer and the fair trade premium are not the core of
fair trade” (Hayes, 2006 p.466.) It is true that one of fair trade’s central im-
pacts is on the input market. However, a suﬃciently large warm glow eﬀect
is necessary for the establishment of the fair trade ﬁrm if trade costs are in-
suﬃciently low (particularly if we assume that the fair trade ﬁrm also has to
carry some ﬁxed start-up costs). Hence, either economic integration and/or
the warm glow eﬀect must be suﬃciently strong in order to make fair trade
production worthwhile. However, where the warm glow eﬀect is present, it
does not necessarily imply that fair trade production warrants any favorable
treatment by the importing country. If fair trade production were supported,
the wage paid to fair trade producers would decrease overproportionally be-
cause each fair trade producer will reduce its eﬀorts and marginal costs will
increase.
Our model has been set up such that it matches the stylized facts of fair
trade production which are (i) that fair trade products aim at the high end
of markets and face competition in these markets or markets of close sub-
21stitutes, (ii) that the number of fair trade producers forming the fair trade
organization is de facto restricted, and (iii) that fair trade organizations must
be vertically integrated in order to be credible, and that this vertical integra-
tion gives rise to a moral hazard problem. Fair trade coﬀee production has
been shown to be the pioneering fair trade brand. Since vertical integration
limits the scale of fair trade production, it is hard to predict whether its in-
crease in market share will continue and whether a lot of other commodities
will follow to be oﬀered also as a fair trade product.
In terms of future work, fair trade production has become more and more
visible and therefore deserves further academic attention. In particular, we
did not take into account that fair trade production may make fair trade
producers less sensitive to market signals. Furthermore, we assumed only
one fair trade producer. If fair trade production will continue to boom, will
more fair trade ﬁrms be established or is competition undermining the warm
glow eﬀect? Indeed, Nicholls and Opal (2004, p.246 ﬀ.) note that the fair
trade ’movement’ already faces threats both from within (competing fair
trade certiﬁcation bodies) and without (from self-certiﬁcation by farmers or
low-cost independent certiﬁcation.) The long-run entry dynamics of this sort
of market are an important and promising area for future research.
Appendix
A.1 The international coﬀee market
In order to motivate some of the modeling assumptions we have made in the
paper, we here present a brief overview of the world coﬀee market. There
are broadly four stages in the production of a cup of coﬀee for a consumer:
the growing of green beans by farmers, the purchase of those beans and pro-
duction of roasted or ground beans or soluble coﬀee by processors (roasters),
the wholesale of that processed output to retailers and the ﬁnal sale to con-
sumers. The current structure of the international coﬀee market (low prices
for farmers, a few major roasters and international traders and thousands
of small, unorganized coﬀee growers) has been interpreted as the outcome
22of a transition from an institutionalized market, heavily controlled for 30
years, to one with little stability and excess supply. From 1962 to 1989 the
world coﬀee market was controlled by the International Coﬀee Agreement
(ICA) through quotas and supply controls signed by producer and consumer
countries, members of the International Coﬀee Organization (ICO). The sole
purpose of such agreements was the stabilization of the market to prevent
ﬂuctuating prices.
The demise of the agreement saw prices drop and they have remained at
historic lows for the last 15 years, which has led to various proposals and
mechanisms designed to ’protect’ small coﬀee farmers. Figure 1 shows the
price per pound in international markets for Arabica and Robusta types from
1957 to 2005. The close co-movement suggests considerable substitutability
between the two types of bean.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
The guarantee of stable prices under the ICA created opportunities for
countries to develop strong coﬀee sectors; furthermore, the price hikes in 1977,
1979 and 1986 (caused by Brazilian frosts) encouraged increased plantations
globally. Underlying this process are low short-run supply and demand price
elasticities. The elasticity of supply is low in the short run since it takes
at least two years for a new tree to be productive, so short run changes
in prices aﬀect other variable factors of production, particularly labour and
hence farmers’ incomes. In the longer run, supply elasticities are higher and
historically growers have responded enthusiastically to sporadic high prices.
Since demand elasticities are argued to be low in the short run also, output
ﬂuctuations can lead to highly volatile prices in periods of high prices con-
sumption does not decrease, and neither increases in periods of low prices
where production is typically high. The demise of the ICA in 1989 has been
attributed to various factors:
• the retirement of United States from the ICA after a change in con-
sumption patterns towards ground (mostly Arabica) rather than solu-
ble (mostly Robusta) coﬀee and its eﬀects on big roasters,
23• the failure of the agreement to constrain country members to quotas,
• the political struggle by producing members to get larger exporting
shares,
• the eﬀort of new producers to enter,
• production ’leakages’ going (coming) to (from) non-member countries.
While there were beneﬁts of the ICA for coﬀee growers in terms of income
stability (see Akiyama and Varangis, 1990) it has also been argued that it
created artiﬁcially high prices, encouraging over-plantation and a subsequent
excess supply. Interestingly, in light of the fondness expressed by many FT
apologists for the quota-controlled days of the ICA, recent evidence (see
Krivonos, 2004) suggests that post-ICA market-oriented reforms have tended
to increase the share of producers in the world price of coﬀee.
But the ICA’s demise is not the only cause of the current reduction in
prices. The excess supply of coﬀee from growing plantations in Brazil and
Vietnam (currently the second largest producer, passing from 73,000 bags
in 1980 to 14 million in 2004), a lower growth rate in consumption (Fig. 2)
and, ﬁnally, technological progress in production (increased mechanization
in Brazilian plantations, more resilient coﬀee plants in Colombia and higher
quality extraction from Robusta coﬀee by roasters), have all been identiﬁed
as sources of the steady reduction in prices since 1986. Figure 2 shows the
four biggest coﬀee producers of the world in 2005. The spectacular growth of
Vietnam since the beginning of the 90s and the peak in production of Brazil
between 1995 and 2002 partially explain the increased supply of the same
period in the world market, as seen in Figure 3.
Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here.
With the end of the ICA, the ’balance of power’ in the world coﬀee mar-
ket changed from producers and consumers associated under one roof – the
ICA-ICO – toward a liberalized market with thousands of coﬀee growers (or-
ganized, or not, in local associations) and a few large international traders
24and roasters. In 1993 a number of producer countries formed the Associa-
tion of Coﬀee Producer Countries (ACPC) in an attempt to control supply
through export retention schemes, but these attempts failed in 1998-99 and
2000-01. Many argue that the current structure of the world coﬀee mar-
ket has tilted in favor of roasters vis-` a-vis other actors (international traders
and growers). As discussed in Ponte (2002), ”International traders argue that
roasters have gained increasing control of the marketing chain in recent years
because of oversupply, increased ﬂexibility in blending and the implementa-
tion of ’supplier-managed inventory’ (SMI)” (p. 1108). SMI allows roasters
to shift inventory holding costs to trading houses; at the same time traders
have strengthened ties with local exporters (upstream market integration).
The ﬁve major roasters (Kraft, Nestl´ e, Procter & Gamble, Sara Lee and
Tchibo) take almost half of the world supply of green coﬀee. The biggest
importer countries in 2005 (with 55% of the market) are the United States,
Germany, Japan, Italy, France and Spain (ﬁgure 4). Aside from these big
roasters, other important players in the market are big supermarket chains,
especially in soluble coﬀee.
Insert Figure 4 about here.
Interestingly, for what used to be a highly regulated market, coﬀee faces
very low import tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ measures (NTM) in major consumer
countries. In 2005, the European Union, the United States, Japan, Canada
and Switzerland, accounted for 90% of the world imports of green coﬀee
and none had tariﬀs or NTM (only Canada in 2000 and Switzerland in 1996
report any NTM against coﬀee). In roasted coﬀee, where the United States,
Canada, European Union, Japan and Australia take almost 70% of world
imports, the EU has a 7.5% tariﬀ and Japan 12%, but the rest have almost
no trade restrictions (Canada, Australia and Switzerland do report some
NTMs in 2000 and 1996).
For trade in processed coﬀee, however, there are some trade restrictions.
For instant coﬀee imports, the EU, with almost 20% of imports in 2005,
applies a 9% tariﬀ, and Japan an average tariﬀ of 15%, and the US and
25Russia report incidence of NTM on 100% of imports.21 Table 1 summarizes
this information.
Insert Table 1 about here.
Alongside the reshaping of the international coﬀee market there has been
a change in coﬀee consumption trends. Specialty coﬀees or ”conscious con-
sumption”,22 single origin coﬀees, coﬀee chains and speciality shops have
emerged as alternatives to the homogenized brands traditionally sold in
supermarkets. The success and growth of coﬀee bars such as Starbucks,
or Tchibo in Germany, has increased public awareness (especially amongst
younger consumers) of the structure of the international coﬀee market, brand-
ing coﬀee consumption as an ”experience” with a cafe atmosphere, new cof-
fee ﬂavours,23 FT branded coﬀee, single origin and gourmet coﬀees (see The
Economist, 2007). In the face of falling prices the question of how to sup-
port the income of small coﬀee growers has been a pressing one. Attempts at
cartelization through growers associations have failed, in a world of market
integration and de-regulation in trade, as noted in the failure of the ACPC
to constrain supply in the early 1990s. One option suggested by some has
been to try to induce coﬀee producer countries to shift up ’the value chain’.
But this faces several obstacles:
• economies of scale in existing processing factories in United States and
Europe are high and diﬃcult to overcome. Sutton (1991) notes very
high ﬁxed costs associated with production of instant coﬀee, in partic-
ular, that constitute a signiﬁcant barrier to small entrants;
21For goods that use coﬀee as a base input, the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia
apply 15% and 5% tariﬀs, respectively. Finally, the countries in the world with the highest
tariﬀs against green coﬀee are India, Seychelles and Bhutan, at 100%, 50% and 50%,
respectively, but insigniﬁcant shares in world trade. For roasted coﬀee Dominica, India
and Mexico set the highest tariﬀs, at 135%, 100% and 72%, respectively. In this segment,
the United States, Switzerland, Canada, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico are the largest
exporters and all except the US impose NTM on 100% of imports.
22Deﬁned in Ponte (2002) as consumption of fair trade, organic, shade-grown and bird-
friendly coﬀees.
23New coﬀee recipes beyond black water coﬀee, such: iced coﬀee, cappuccino, frapuccino,
mocha (chocolate blended coﬀees), caramel coﬀee, etc.
26• brand space crowding by existing leading coﬀee brands (ground and
soluble) means the creation and commercialization of new brands may
not be a viable solution for small coﬀee growers;
• shelving and transportation of ground and soluble coﬀee is more expen-
sive than green coﬀee storage. For eﬃcient transportation, processed
coﬀee must be agglomerated and re-packed, which aﬀects the initial
quality reached in blending; also transportation of packed coﬀee is more
expensive as it is heavier;
• packing, advertising and branding from producer countries may be
more expensive than in consumer countries, given strict regulation in
the latter.
It is under these circumstances that the FT initiative has promoted its
labelling campaign from coﬀee growers to ﬁnal retailers, guaranteeing a ’de-
cent’ income for farmers and informing consumers of the good deed they are
doing in buying FT branded coﬀee. The growth of FT has been impressive,
especially in recent years. In Europe it has experienced almost 25% growth
in sales outlets since 1999. In the US, the market share increased from 0.60%
to 4.30% in the specialty sector; and from 0.20% to 2.20% of total coﬀee sales
between 2000 and 2005 (Wilkinson, 2006).
In light of this discussion, in the model of the paper we assume that
the processing and marketing of coﬀee is dominated by a few large ﬁrms
buying green coﬀee on a world spot market with no cartelization of producers;
that there are quality-diﬀerentiated varieties of ﬁnal-good coﬀee which are
substitutes in demand and the oligopolists sell to both markets; that a FT
ﬁrm is eﬀectively vertically integrated over the growing and marketing stages
of high-quality green beans which are then sold on to processors; that the FT
ﬁrm returns all surplus to its farmers; that consumers of high quality coﬀee
are willing to pay a premium increasing in the wage paid to farmers; and that
all production of beans occurs in a country diﬀerent to that in which coﬀee is
consumed so that all middlemen ﬁrms incur trade costs. Furthermore, in our
model there are two ways of producing high-quality ﬁnal coﬀee: one is due
27to higher farmer eﬀort in growing the input beans and the other is through
higher cost processing of input beans.
A.2 No rivalry in the high quality market
The ﬁrst-order condition for the FT ﬁrm reads
α − z∗ − γn
A−t−γz∗










1 + n − nγ2













2(1 − δ)2 < 0, (A.2)
and is clearly negative. Hence, surplus is strictly concave in z if z > ˆ z.
Diﬀerentiating (A.1) w.r.t. t yields
−
n(1 − γ) + 1






Diﬀerentiating (A.1) w.r.t. γ yields
4γz∗ − (A − t)









A.3 Rivalry in the high quality market
Using (9), we may rewrite the high-quality price as a function of z:
q(z) = α − n(γxi(z) + yi(z)) − z =
α + n(c + t) − z
n + 1
. (A.4)













The ﬁrst-order condition for the FT ﬁrm is
α+n(c+t)−z∗



















Note carefully that (A.6) does not depend on γ; hence any change in γ will
not change the number of FT producers (see Proposition 4) unless it leads





(1 − δ)2 < 0, (A.7)
and is clearly negative. Hence, surplus is strictly concave in z if z < ˆ z.
Diﬀerentiating (A.6) w.r.t. t yields
−
1






The size of dz∗/dt can be determined by using the implicit function theorem
and (A.7) and (A.8). This leads to dz∗/dt as used in Proposition 2. As for
the changes of x∗∗
i and y∗∗
i with γ, note that we may compute them by using





(1 − γ2)(α − c − t) − 2γ(A − t)
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(1 − γ2)(n + 1)
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A − (1 − γ)t − γ(α − c)
(n + 1)(1 − γ2)
.
29A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Totally diﬀerenting (11) w.r.t. z and δ – taking into account that dX/dz and
dY/dz do not depend on δ – shows that dz∗/dδ and ∂2S/∂z∂δ have the same













































α − z − Y − γX − θ − t




























µ(1 − δ)3 > 0, (A.12)
which proves that an increase in the warm glow eﬀect increases the number
of FT producers. Furthermore, the oligopolistic output levels decrease with
an increase in z∗ (see (8) and (9)). ￿
A.5 Proof of Proposition 6
We may rewrite the FT ﬁrm’s objective funtion (6) such that the surplus is
given by















30The FT ﬁrm maximizes surplus so that
dS
dz
= w + z
dw
dz













2µz2(1 − δ)2. ￿
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33Figure 1.  Arabica and Robusta coffee prices.  Constant 2000 US$/lb, deflated by US CPI.
Figure 2.  Largest coffee producers.  Top 4 coffee producers in 2005.  Millions of 60k bags.Figure 3.  ICO members’ production and world imports.  Millions of 60k bags.
Figure 4.  Largest coffee importers.  Top 6 coffee importers in 2005.  Millions of 60k bags.Country World imports share MFN Mean (%) NTM Incidence (%)
European Union 0.491 0 0
United States 0.258 0 0
Japan 0.101 0 0
Canada 0.032 0 100
Switzerland 0.021 0 100
Country World exports share MFN Mean (%) NTM Incidence (%)
Brazil 0.300 10 100
Colombia 0.152 15 100
Vietnam 0.090 20 100
Indonesia 0.056 2.5 100
Guatemala 0.053 13.8 100
Honduras 0.041 13.8 0
Country World imports share MFN Mean (%) NTM Incidence (%)
United States 0.251 0 0
Canada 0.247 0 100
European Union 0.125 7.5 0
Japan 0.044 12 0
Australia 0.036 0 100
Switzerland 0.031 N.A. 100
country World exports share MFN Mean (%) NTM Incidence (%)
United States 0.369 0 0
Switzerland 0.286 N.A. 100
Canada 0.133 0 100
Brazil 0.055 10 100
Colombia 0.029 17.5 100
Mexico 0.025 72 100
Country World imports share MFN Mean (%) NTM Incidence (%)
European Union 0.189 9 0
United States 0.161 0 100
Russian Federation 0.157 N.A. 100
Japan 0.081 15.9 0
Country World imports share MFN Mean (%) NTM Incidence (%)
Russian Federation 0.138 15 100
Saudi Arabia 0.079 5 0
China (Taiwan) 0.067 2 100
Canada 0.066 0 0
Notes: a. Non roasted, non decaffeinated coffee (beans) Harmonized Trade System (HTS) No. 090111. b. 
Roasted, non decaffeinated coffee (beans) HTS No. 090121. c. Instant coffee, not flavor non decaffeinated 
packaged for retail sale HTS No. 210111. d. Preparations with a base of coffee extracts for retail sale HTS 
No. 210112. MFN: Most favore nation. NTM: Non Tariff Measure
Source: UNCTAD - TRAINS. www.unctad.org
Green coffee /a
Roasted coffee /b
Instant coffee packaged for retail /c
Preparations with coffee extracts /d
Table 1. Coffee trade tariffs. Largest importers and exporters. Where imports are 
shown, the table refers to tariffs imposed by the biggest importer of the good. Where exports are shown 
the table refers to tariffs on imports imposed by the biggest exporter.